In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AN IMPORTANT NEW STUDY OF THOMAS AQUINAS: JEAN-PIERRE TORRELL'S INITIATION A SAINT THOMAS D'AQUIN WALTER H. PRINCIPE, C.S.B. Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies Toronto, Canada BEFORE BECOMING professor of theology at the Universite de Fribourg, Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., was a member of the Leonine Commission. This editorial experience, together with his continuing association with members of the commission, enables him in his new work, Initiation a saint Thomas (...) d'Aquin: Sa personne et son oeuvre, to clarify and frequently modify previous research conclusions about the life and work of Thomas Aquinas.1 Thus other recent studies in this area, e.g., those of James A. Weisheipl and Simon Tugwell, will have to be reassessed in the light of Torrell's findings in this important volume.2 Torrell, however, does more than examine the dates and places of Thomas's career and writing: as the book's subtitle and introduction make clear, his aim is to present the person of Thomas Aquinas in his context. This he does in a warm but measured fashion, situating Aquinas in his times, following Thomas's journeys about France and Italy on his intellectual apostolatea true ministry in the Dominican tradition-portraying him as 1 In the series Vestigia: Pensee antique et medievale 13 (Fribourg Suisse: Editions Universitaires; Paris: Cerf, 1993), pp. xviii, 592. 2 See Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Works, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1983), and Tugwell, trans., ed., introd., Albert & Thomas: Selected Writings, The Classics of Western Spirituality (New York-Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1988), introd. [to Thomas Aquinas], pp. 201-351. 489 490 WALTER H. PRINCIPE, C.S.B. often nearly overwhelmed by the duties of this apostolate, yet vigorous and lively in defense of the faith and of the legitimate role of reason, a warm friend to many con,freres and others, a loyal and sometimes deeply involved member of his family. Torrell is especially adept at linking Thomas's apostolic activity with his profound and distinctive spirituality; this augurs well for Torrell 's promised companion volume, which will deal far more thoroughly with Thomas's spirituality than was possible within the editorial constraints of his earlier article in the Dictionnaire de spiritualite.3 New conclusions about the place and dating of Thomas's works Here, first, will be given a summary, with occasional comment, of this study's significant new conclusions about the place and dating of Thomas's works. Torrell accepts Weisheipl's view that Aquinas did his initial biblical commentary at Cologne before coming to Paris in 1252 and spent the years 1252-1256 working on the Scriptum super Sententiis. The "bref catalogue" at the end, prepared by G. Emery, O.P., states that this work is the "fruit of his teaching as bachelor of the Sentences at the begin;.. ning of his first stay in Paris ( 1252-54) ; its redaction had not yet been completed when he began his activity as Master ( 1256)" (485; emphasis mine). Weisheipl, with whom Torrell agrees as to Thomas's having done his cursory teaching of the Bible at Cologne, holds that Thomas lectured on the Senten:ces for the four years, 1252-1256 (71, 358); Tugwell seems to hold the same position when he speaks of Thomas "writing [his lectures on the Sentences] up for publication as he went" (211). Torrell's limitation of the teaching of the Sentences to 1252-1254 is based on the university statutes prescribing that this teaching be completed in two years (66), after which the candidate for the mastership would be a " formed bachelor " (baccalaureus formatus) whose main task would be to assist the master of 3 See his "Thomas d'Aquin," Dictionnaire de Spiritualite 15 (1991), cols. 718-73. INITIATION A SAINT THOMAS D1 AQUIN 491 theology with his disputed questions (58). This would mean that Thomas spent two whole years, 1254-1256, carrying out this rather minimal duty, redacting the Sentences (a task not completed until the beginning of his period as a master of theology), and composing two small works, the De ente et essentia and the De principiis naturae. Although the Scriptum is a... (shrink)

There are few books in any language which attempt to survey the whole range of Lukács' work. English readers may, therefore, consider themselves fortunate to have available the present volume and, doubly fortunate, to have forthcoming in late 1970 or early 1971 yet another book by one of the present contributors, István Mészáros, titled the Life and Work of Georg Lukács. The work under review is based on a series of lectures in 1968 at the Graduate School of Contemporary (...) European Studies at the University of Reading. The Introduction by Parkinson is largely expository and concentrates on Lukacs' celebrated Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. The individual essays which follow are critical examinations of Lukács' views in the fields of philosophy, sociology, and literary criticism. The essays are generally of a high caliber and the differences which the authors express in relation to various aspects of Lukács are themselves testimony to the complexity and depth of his thought. The most comprehensive, and, in many ways, the most interesting approach to Lukács is in the lead-off essay by Mészáros which, in the context of dealing with his concept of the dialectic, seeks to disclose the basic structure of Lukács' thought and to establish its continuity from the young Lukács to the mature Lukács. Mészáros finds from the very beginning not only a revolutionary turn in Lukács' structure of thought, but along with it--or within it--or perhaps even conditioning it--a complex and far-ranging "ought". The "ought-ridden" character of Lukács' thought, Mészáros claims, is both the source of some of his great intellectual achievements and of some of his great failures, particularly when he substitutes ideology and moral postulates for mediated, concrete reality. Those interested in the development of the concept of the dialectic from Hegel to Marx and from Marx to the present will find Mészáros' discussion of Lukács' categories of "totality" and "mediation" informative and thought-provoking. H. A. Hodges examines Lukács' critique of philosophical irrationalism and singles out for special study his comments on the degree to which Dilthey and Mannheim contributed toward this trend. Parkinson, in addition to writing the introduction, has an essay on the nature of Besonderheit, the central category of Lukács' aesthetics. He translates Besonderheit as "speciality" or "the special." Roy Pascal digs into Lukács' concept of totality as developed in the Ästhetik and as applied in his critique of Walter Scott and of Kafka. In addition, there is an essay by David Craig on how, in Lukács' view, history molds literature, and another essay by Stanley Mitchell on Lukács' concept of the "beautiful." All in all, while the book does not represent a definitive or inclusive introduction to the work of Lukács, it does constitute an important landmark in presenting many important dimensions of his thought, as well as some highly critical appraisals of its validity and importance.--H. B. (shrink)

This study was conducted during 111 days of coronavirus disease 2019 lockdown and reviewed current media articles that revealed government bodies and institutions have come to view people not as priceless treasures, but in terms of the money they can generate and the economic value they may give to a nation. This view was contrasted with the historic Christian concept of inherent royalty and value that is intrinsic to all people, and embodied in monarchs and bishops. This study focuses on (...) a review of historical literature and biblical texts around monarchy and the episcopacy in light of current media articles related to COVID-19. It found that politics and policy need to be grounded into the more fundamental aspects of our human condition and that it is the compassion and care people have for those who are more fragile: be it financially, physically, mentally or spiritually, that bishops and monarchs should be embodying in a time of COVID-19.Contribution: This study drew its key insights from contested historical thoughts on the role of monarchs and bishops. The results of this line of thinking challenge us as we consider the future function and role of these positions, and what they mean in times of crises. The key insight gained is the reminder that the lives of all people in our communities are important as each person holds an intrinsic value that cannot be traded for the sake of a country’s economy and business desires to turn a profit during the COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

This essay examines Michael Polanyi’s notion of tacit knowing and seeks to clarify and elaborate upon its claims. Tacit knowing, which is conscious although inarticulate, must be distinguished from tacit processes, which are largely unconscious. Schematization is explored as a primary tacit process that humans share with all animals. This tacit process organizes and secures, in long-term memory, information of interest provided by receptors and those learned skifls conducive to survival. Human empirical knowing integrates schematized subsidiaries info articulate explicitness through (...) culturally-embedded symbols evoked in terms of felt fittingness. (shrink)

What is the nature and scope of aesthetic sensibility and thought? Answers to this question have varied greatly over the centuries. In recent decades, however, there have been few attempts to describe the nature and scope of aesthetics within the ambiance of a far-reaching context that takes account of contemporary developments in relevant disciplines. My intention in this essay is to sketch out the contours of such a comprehensive theory.Toward that end I will first offer a brief impressionistic account of (...) the varied ways aesthetic qualities of experience have been treated during the unfolding of Western thought. In Plato's Symposium, the loving attention devoted to facets of beauty interprets them as but varied... (shrink)

Joseph Bracken proposes to modify Whitehead’s tendency to see the comprehensive entities of everyday life as but aggregations of actual occasions. While there are resources in Polanyi’s notion of an emergent cosmos to counter Whitehead’s atomism and reductionism, Bracken’s use of Polanyi’s theory of a morphogenetic field as a corrective is argued to be only partially successful. Bracken must explain how morphogenetic fields evolve and arise. This step would require replacing Whiteheadian reductionism with a principle of ontological parity that honors (...) the reality of interaction between entities and the integration of their operational principles within basic ontological levels and setting forth principles of emergence to explain how these levels and fields arise. (shrink)

Are there aspects of human intelligence that artificial intelligence cannot emulate? Harry Collins uses a distinction between tacit aspects of knowing, which cannot be digitized, and explicit aspects, which can be, to formulate an answer to this question. He postulates three purported areas of the tacit and argues that only “collective tacit knowing” cannot be adequately digitized. I argue, first, that Collins’s approach rests upon problematic Cartesian assumptions—particularly his claim that animal knowing is strictly deterministic and, thus, radically different from (...) human knowing. I offer evidence that human linguistic intelligence depends upon embodied forms of animal intelligence. Second, I suggest the development of deep-learning algorithms means that Collins’s mimesis assumption is no longer appropriate; equivalent accomplishment of goals is what counts. However, persons must realize and integrate many goals and also deal with failures; a general-purpose AI capable of integrating all the needs and goals of human existence resists development. Third, I explain how Michael Polanyi’s understanding of tacit knowing, quite different than Collins’s concept of the tacit, exemplifies features that are missing in contemporary AI. I make use of evolutionary theory, studies of animal intelligence, biological insights, individual construction of meaning, and notions of human responsibility to argue for the existence of three categories that distinguish human from artificial intelligence. (shrink)

Religious naturalism takes very seriously the meanings inherent in both a scientific understanding of the world and a religious orientation to life well lived. It rejects—as implausible and incompatible with science— the supernaturalism that has dominated Western religious traditions. But can one or more of the varieties of religious naturalism satisfy the fundamental religious needs or yearnings for meaning that have typically been responded to within supernaturalistic worldviews? A challenge facing all types of religious naturalism, if any are to take (...) hold, is to engage these religiously colored needs and yearnings with coherence and integrity.Religious belief and practice typically seem to have more to do with .. (shrink)

This essay critically discusses books not previously reviewed in Tradition and Discovery yet making significant use of Michael Polanyi’s thought. These works suggest Polanyi’s thought continues to play an importanf, if limited, role in contemporary scholarship.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Democracy, Spirit, and RevitalizationWalter B. Gulick (bio)The assumptions of democracy as an associational ethos of vulnerable life are, first, that we don't already know how best to order our common life and, second, that we don't know what the abstract ideals of empathy, emancipation, and equity entail in the concrete.—Michael Hogue1In American Immanence: Democracy for an Uncertain World, Michael S. Hogue grounds his proposal for a political theology in (...) a critique of American exceptionalism and its supportive "redeemer symbolic."2 In the Anthropocene era, Hogue states, American exceptionalism "legitimates the extraction of diverse forms of value and justifies the externalization of diverse costs" (29) with unconscionable costs to the natural environment and international justice. As indicated in the passage quoted above, Hogue's reaction to the rigid assumptions supportive of American exceptionalism is to offer a humble acknowledgement of political fallibility coupled with what he terms "a theopolitics of resilient democracy" (184; see also 3–6).My concern in this essay is largely practical. I will focus on discerning what intellectual, emotional, and communal resources might be drawn upon to further develop and actually effect the needed changes that Hogue so ably points out. Relatedly, I will inquire into who the most likely candidates are to devote energy to the reconstruction of social structures and practices so that they express values that Americans at their best uphold. Finally, I will reflect upon the role that spiritual ideals and communal practices might play in energizing effective democratic action. [End Page 5]I. Hogue's Critical and Constructive TasksHogue's overriding interest is to outline an epistemic/axiological/environmental/political stance that does not give rise to the various sorts of injustices and dysfunctions that mark the Anthropocene era, especially our allegiance to policies that eventuate in what he calls "climate wickedness." The alternative vision he embraces develops pragmatic naturalism as a method of inquiry and exposition. His reflections are especially indebted to the thought of Dewey, James, and Whitehead (78–82). During a time when e-words are normally associated with forms of electronic communication, Hogue offers instead two trios of e-words with another sort of significance—one that signifies a stance he wishes to overcome and one that communicates what he hopes to achieve. Our current era is unfortunately in thrall, he says, to extraction, externalization, and exception, whereas what we should strive for is a society marked by empathy, emancipation, and equitability. Well put. He presupposes that democratic governance, deeply embedded in American history, ought to serve as the vehicle for achieving what the positive set of e-words promotes. To this end, Hogue quotes appreciatively from Dewey's article, "Democracy is Radical": Democracy "is radical because it requires great change in existing social institutions, economic, legal and cultural" (170). This understanding of democracy slumbers now; what might it take to reawaken it? And if reawakened, what changes might be made to establish the more nearly equitable political influence that is basic to the promise of democracy?Hogue, recognizing in good pragmatic fashion the importance of consequential change, states, "In contrast to foundationalist commitments to antecedents and precedents, pragmatic naturalism commits to a prospective concern with consequents" (80). Foundational commitments to antecedents may certainly impede needed change, but surely attention to the historical events and practices that gave rise to current problems is needed to avoid repeating previous errors. Hogue refers to Whitehead's vision of social symbolism, suggesting that "social change can be catalyzed by the improvised revision of existing symbolic repertoires or the innovative formation or subversive interjection of new symbols" (99). I'm not fully convinced by Whitehead's claim. I suspect that many of our social problems are rooted below the linguistic level in an array of affective issues that elude symbolic adjustment. New strategies are needed to counter the prevalence of fear and resentment in society as promoted for political and commercial reasons and tied to Hogue's strongly voiced recognition that we live in an uncertain world.Here is my understanding of how Hogue both frames our current social and cultural situation and what he says might begin to remediate these circumstances. [End Page... (shrink)